

Message Text

PAGE 01 CAIRO 17706 01 OF 02 231746Z POSS DUPE
ACTION INR-07

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 ISO-00 CIAE-00 NSAE-00 PM-04 NSC-05
SP-02 SS-15 DODE-00 INRE-00 /044 W
-----231911Z 109058 /65
P 231500Z DEC 76
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9976

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 CAIRO 17706

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINT PINR EG
SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF DECISION-MAKING IN EGYPT

REF: STATE 303918

1. SUMMARY. THE EGYPTIAN DECISION-MAKING PROCESS IS MARKED BY A HIGH DEGREE OF CENTRALIZED PERSONALIZATION AND BY A DECIDED RELUCTANCE ON THE PART OF SENIOR GOE OFFICIALS, INCLUDING CABINET MEMBERS, TO TAKE ANY BUT THE MOST TECHNICAL DECISIONS ON THEIR OWN RESPONSIBILITY. SADAT, AS THE CONSTITUTIONAL APEX OF THE GOE, DOMINATES THE PROCESS. HE RESERVES CERTAIN MATTERS, ESPECIALLY THOSE WITH HIGH POLITICAL CONTENT, TO HIMSELF AND SELECTIVELY INTERVENES IN OTHERS. SINCE THE PRESIDENT HAS NO GREAT INTEREST OR EXPERTISE IN ECONOMICS, DECISIONS OF AN ECONOMIC NATURE TEND TO DEVOLVE ON THE PRIME MINISTER, EXCEPT INsofar AS THEY MAY HAVE POLITICAL DIMENSIONS. IN SUCH INSTANCES, SADAT WILL BE CONSULTED AND WILL USUALLY OPT FOR A SOLUTION THAT GIVES GREATER WEIGHT TO THE POLITICAL THAN THE ECONOMIC ASPECT, E.G., IMF RECOMMENDATION ON ECONOMIC REFORM. IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ARAB AFFAIRS, SADAT HAS ENTRUSTED FONMIN FAHMY WITH WIDE DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY, WHICH FAHMY EXERCISES TO THE HILT. ARAB AFFAIRS REMAIN A PREROGATIVE OF SADAT, WHO MAY NEVERTHELESS ASK FAHMY TO DO THE NECESSARY DRAFTING. IN MILITARY MATTERS, THE PRESIDENT RELIES VERY HEAVILY UPON DEPPRIMIN/MINWAR GAMASY, THOUGH WE HAVE WITNESSED SEVERAL INSTANCES IN WHICH SADAT OVERRULED
SECRET

PAGE 02 CAIRO 17706 01 OF 02 231746Z POSS DUPE

GAMASY. THE PRIMIN AND THE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY PRIMINS (FAHMY AND GAMASY) HAVE A FINE "FINGERSPITZENGEFUHL" OF WHAT NEEDS SPECIFIC PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL AND WHAT THEY CAN DO ON THEIR OWN DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY. IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION, ANY DISCUSSION OF DECISION MAKING IN EGYPT MUST FIRST FOCUS ON SADAT AND THE CHARACTERISTICS OF HIS LEADERSHIP. END SUMMARY.

2. SADAT'S LEADERSHIP SKILLS ARE WELL-KNOWN; REALISM, POLITICAL ACUMEN AND COURAGE, A FLAIR FOR THE DRAMATIC AND EMPATHY WITH HIS

PEOPLE. LIKE MOST EGYPTIANS, HE IS OBSESSED WITH EGYPT'S AND HIS OWN LEADERSHIP ROLES IN THE ARAB WORLD AND LIKES TO HEAR THAT USG VIEWS HIM AS THE PRINCIPAL ARAB LEADER. HE WAS DEEPLY HURT WHEN USG SEEMED TO BE GIVING THE NOD TO ASAD EARLIER THIS YEAR, THOUGH HE CONTINUED TO WORK CLOSELY WITH US. SADAT IS PARTICULARLY CONFIDENT ABOUT HIS ABILITY TO UNDERSTAND EGYPTIAN MENTALITY AND GAUGE THEIR REACTION TO GOVERNMENTAL DECISIONS. HE IS UNLIKELY TO TURN TO OTHERS FOR THIS KIND OF ADVICE.

3. SENTIMENT. DESPITE HIS REALISM AND STRATEGIC SENSE IN FOREIGN POLICY, SADAT TENDS TO PERSONALIZE HIS DEALINGS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES, EVEN MORE THAN MOST ARAB LEADERS. WHILE HIS PERSONAL PHOBIA ABOUT THE RUSSIANS IS WELL KNOWN (AND PROBABLY JUSTIFIED), HIS APPROACH TO OTHER COUNTRIES CAN ALSO BE INFLUENCED BY PERSONAL RAPPORT. WOUN SADAT HAS DEVELOPED CONFIDENCE IN A FOREIGN LEADER, HE STANDS BY HIM EVEN AGAINST THE VIEWS OF HIS ADVISORS WHO MAY CRITICISE ACTIONS TAKEN BY THAT LEADER. CORRELARILY, ONCE HIS CONFIDENCE IS SHAKEN FOR WHATEVER REASON, HE SWINGS TO THE OPPOSITE EXTREME AND IS HARD TO BRING AROUND AGAIN. LACK OF PERSONAL RAPPORT CAN ADVERSELY AFFECT BILATERAL RELATIONS. IT IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT THAT AMERICAN LEADERS TRY TO KNOW SADAT PERSONALLY AND DEAL WITH HIM NOT ONLY AS A PRESIDENT BUT AS A TRUSTED FRIEND. LITTLE THINGS MEAN A LOT.

4. LOYALTY. SADAT PLACES A SPECIAL PREMIUM ON LOYALTY IN HIS CHOICE OF ADVISORS. SINCE PROVED LOYALTY AND RELIANCE ON KNOWN FAMILY AND FRIENDS ARE OFTEN OVERRIDING CONSIDERATIONS, THE SECRET

PAGE 03 CAIRO 17706 01 OF 02 231746Z POSS DUPE

MEN AROUND SADAT ARE NOT ALWAYS BEST SUITED FOR THE JOB, EG, PRIME MINISTER SALIM AS THE "ECONOMIC CZAR" DESPITE THE FACT THAT HE IS A CAREER POLICE OFFICIAL. NOR DO THEY LIKE TO BE BEARERS OF BAD NEWS. THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUGGEST THAT SADAT IS OFTEN NOT AWARE OF ADVERSE DEVELOPMENTS.

5. WORK HABITS. SADAT IS NOT INTERESTED IN DETAIL. HE STRONGLY PREFERS ORAL BRIEFINGS AND TALKING WITH FRIENDS TO MEMORANDA OR BRIEFING PAPERS. HE NO LONGER READS MUCH. THERE IS AMPLE EVIDENCE THAT IN MATTERS ON WHICH HE DOES NOT ALREADY HOLD STRONG VIEWS, HE CAN BE INFLUENCED BY THOSE WHO ARE MOST PERSUASIVE OR SEE HIM LAST.

6 IN SUMMARY, SADAT IS CAPABLE OF DRAMATIC AND COURAGEOUS DECISIONS. HOWEVER, HE IS ALSO CAPABLE OF BEING DECISIVE ON THE BASIS OF WRONG OR INCOMPLETE INFORMATION PROVIDED TO HIM (OR KEPT FROM HIM) BY SOME OF HIS ADVISORS. IN ANY MATTERS AFFECTING US INTERESTS, IT IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT THAT WE DEALY WITH HIM PERSONALLY AND IN MANNER OF TRUSTED FRIEND AND DO OUR BEST TO SEE THAT HIS INFORMATION IS AS ACCURATE AND COMPLETE AS POSSIBLE. HE APPRECIATES PRESIDENTIAL IF THEY HAVE SUBSTANCE.

7. WHO HAS SADAT'S EAR ON POLICY MATTERS AND HOW ARE THEY INFLUENCED?

(A) SAYYID MAR'I. SAYYID MAR'I HAS EASY AND FREQUENT ACCESS TO THE PRESIDENT AND HIS SON, HASSAN, IS MARRIED TO SADAT'S DAUGHTER. THEY DISCUSS VIRTUALLY ALL SUBJECTS AND SADAT RELIES HEAVILY, BUT NOT EXCLUSIVELY, ON MAR'S'S ADVICE ON DOMESTIC POLITICAL AFFAIRS. THROUGH MAR'I, SADAT GAUGES THE TEMPER OF THE PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY AND CONTROLS THAT BODY ON MATTERS DEEMED SUFFICIENTLY IMPORTANT TO WARRANT PRESIDENTIAL INTERVENTION. MAR'I IS BELIEVED TOTALLY LOYAL TO SADAT. HE HE COMES FROM AN UPPER MIDDLE CLASS LANDOWNING FAMILY AND AGRICULTURE HAS REMAINED HIS PREDOMINANT INTEREST. WHILE HE PERHAPS MOST ACCURATELY REFLECTS THE CONCERNS OF THE LANDOWNERS,

SECRET

PAGE 04 CAIRO 17706 01 OF 02 231746Z POSS DUPE

HE IS, BY VIRTUE OF HIS POSITION AS SPEAKER OF PEOPLES ASSEMBLY, IN TOUCH WITH THE VIEWS OF MOST ELEMENTS OF THE POPULATION. WE BELIEVE HE ACCURATELY CONVEYS HIS VIEWS TO SADAT AND IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO ARE CONFIDENT ENOUGH OF THE RELATIONSHIP TO CONVEY BAD NEWS. MAR' I IS STRONG SUPPORTEDR OF SADAT'S FOREIGN POLICY AND THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION OF EGYPT.

(B) OSMAN AHMED OSMAN. ALTHOUGH OSMAN HAS RECENTLY BEEN DEMOTED OUT OF THE CABINET (LARGELY BECAUSE HE OVERPLAYED HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH SADAT AND THE OTHER MINISTERS GANGED UP TO CURB HIS GOROWING POWER), IS IS LIKELY TO REMAIN A SADAT CONFIDENT (HIS SON IS MARRYING SADAT'S 15-YEAR OLD DAUGHTER ON JANUARY 2). OSMAN REPRESENTS TO SADAT THE THINKING OF THE BUSINESS AND ENTREPRENEURAL CALSS. HE PROBABLY FEELS FREE TO ADVISE SADAT ON A WIDE RANGE OF ECONOMIC ISSUES--SOMETIMES FOR HIS OWN PROFIT. WE DOUBT THAT HE WOULD BE THE BEARER OF BAD TIDINGS THOUGH HE IS QUITE WILLING TO CRITICIZE THE PERFORMANCE OF OTHER MINISTERS. SADAT LIKES OSMAN BECAUSE OF THE LATTER'S ABILITY TO GET THINGS DONE.

(C) JIHAN SADAT) MRS. SADAT HAS UNPARALLELED ACCESS TO THE PRESIDENT AND HAS STRONG VIEWS ON A WIDE VARIETY OF SUBJECTS. THERE IS INCREASING EVIDENCE THAT SHE IS USING HER POSITION TO HELP HER FAVORITES GAIN ACCESS TO SADAT AND TO INTERFERE IN VAIRIETY OF GOVERNMENTAL MATTERS. SHE HAS REPUTATION FOR BEING SOMETHING OF AN "EMINENCE GRISE" AND SHE SEEMS TO BE MOVING TO COFIRM IT. SHE STRONGLY ADMIRES MRS. MARCOS, FOR EXAMPLE. MRS. SADAT ENGAGES IN MANY "GOOD WORKS", AND HER SPECIAL CONCERNS ARE WOMEN, POPULATION CONTROL AND THE HANDICAPPED. SHE IS ABOVE ALL COMMITTED TO THE PRESIDENT. ALTHOUGH PRO-AMERICAN, SHE IS ONE OF THOSE WHO HAVE URGED SADAT TO "NORMALIZE" HIS RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS SO AS NOT TO BE TOO CLOSELY ALIGNED WITH EITHER SUPER POWER.

SECRET

PAGE 01 CAIRO 17706 02 OF 02 231813Z POSS DUPE
ACTION INR-07

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 ISO-00 CIAE-00 NSAE-00 PM-04 NSC-05
SP-02 SS-15 DODE-00 INRE-00 /044 W
-----231912Z 109611 /65

P 231500Z DEC 76
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9977

S E C R E T FINAL SECTION OF 2 CAIRO 17706

(D) MUHAMMAD ABDUL GHANI AL GAMASY. GAMASY, AS MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, IS THE SPOKESMAN FOR THE PROFESSIONAL MILITARY. FROM THE EVIDENCE WE HAVE HE LIMITS HIS ADVICE TO SADAT LARGELY TO MILITARY MATTERS AND PROFESSES TO HAVE NO USE FOR POLITICS. ANY POLITICAL RECOMMENDATIONS HE MIGHT MAKE WOULD FLOW FROM HIS CONCERN ABOUT THE CONDITION OF THE MILITARY, E.G. THE NEED FOR A NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS IN ORDER TO OBTAIN A RESUMPTION OF MILITARY SPARE PARTS AND EQUIPMENT DELIVERIES. GAMASY IS BELIEVED LOYAL BOTH TO SADAT AND TO HIS CONSTITUENCY WHICH MAKES HIM THE MIDDLE MAN BETWEEN SADAT AND A MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT THAT IS NOT RECEIVING NEW ARMS (WHILE ITS ENEMY IS) AND IS SUFFERING A DROP IN ITS STANDARD OF LIVING. IF DISCONTENT IN THE MILITARY GROWS, GAMASY'S POSITION BECOMES ALMOST UNTENABLE, BUT WE BELIEVE HE WILL LOYALLY CARRY OUT HIS DUTIES AND TRY TO KEEP SADAT RELATIVELY HONESTLY INFORMED OF THE STATUS AND MORALE OF THE FORCES.

(E) KAMAL HASSAN ALI. AS HEAD OF GENERAL INTELLIGENCE (FOREIGN NATIONS) AND MEMBER OF NSC IS ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL SOURCES OF INTELLIGENCE TO SADAT. HOWEVER, THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT HE PLAYS ANY PROMINENT PART IN POLITICAL DECISIONS.

(F) ISMAIL FAHMY. WHILE FAHMY IS SADAT'S CHIEF FOREIGN POLICY ADVISOR, HE ALSO GIVES THE PRESIDENT VIEWS ON OTHER SUBJECTS ABOUT WHICH HE FEELS CONFIDENT LIKE TOURISM, ATOMIC SECRET

PAGE 02 CAIRO 17706 02 OF 02 231813Z POSS DUPE

ENERGY AND ECONOMIC PROJECTS. FAHMY DOES NOT SPEAK FOR ANY SIGNIFICANT CONSTITUENCY. SADAT HAS HIGH REGARD FOR FAHMY'S KNOWLEDGE OF AND SKILL IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND, EXCEPT FOR ARAB MATTERS, HAS GIVEN FAHMY CONSIDERABLE DECISION-MAKING LATITUDE--MORE THAN ANY PREVIOUS FOREIGN MINISTER. FAHMY HAS GREAT INFLUENCE ON SADAT, AND HIS CAPACITY AS THE DRAFTER OF VIRTUALLY ALL OF THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGES TO FOREIGN LEADERS, HE CAN SHAPE THE DETAILS, IF NOT THE SUBSTANCE OF MOST FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS.

(G) HUSNI MUBARAK. WHILE MUBARAK MAY STILL REPRESENT IMPORTANT SEGMENT IN EGYPTIAN MILITARY, HE HAS NOT THUS FAR

PROVED EFFECTIVE AS VP. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE PRESIDENCY WHICH, SINCE ASHRAF MARWAN'S DEPARTURE, FALLS UNDER HIS RESPONSIBILITY IS WEAKER THAN IT HAS BEEN FOR MANY YEARS. HIS VENTURES INTO FOREIGN AFFAIRS AS A SPECIAL ENVOY HAVE NOT BEEN NOTABLY SUCCESSFUL. HIS ROLE TODAY IS "CHIEF OF STAFF" OR "SENIOR AIDE" TO THE PRESIDENT. HE DOES FILTER INFORMATION AND PEOPLE REACHING SADAT AND SINCE SADAT IS NOT ALWAYS KEPT INFORMED, SOME OF THE FAULT MUST REST WITH MUBARAK. MUBARAK ALSO BRINGS TALES OF WHAT OTHER CABINET MEMBERS HAVE SAID THAT MIGHT BE CRITICAL OF THE PRESIDENT.

(H) MAMDUH SALIM. SALIM IS TOTALLY LOYAL TO SADAT AND THE POLICE OFFICER MOST RESPONSIBLE FOR SADAT'S 1971 CONSOLIDATION OF POWER. SALIM HAS COME TO ENJOY THE PRIME MINISTERSHIP AND THERE IS SOME SUGGESTION THAT HE IS NOW WIDENING HIS HORIZONS, PLACING HIS MEN IN KEY POSITIONS, AND TAKING OTHER ACTIONS TO PROMOTE HIS OWN FUTURE, BUT WITHOUT IN ANY WAY UNDERMINING OR BEING DISLOYAL TO SADAT. SALIM REPRESENTS THE VERY IMPORTANT SECURITY SERVICES CONSITUENCY AND THE BUREAUCRACY. HE IS USED BY SADAT TO ORGANIZE THE NEW TRI-PARTY POLITICAL SYSTEM AND IS ESPECIALLY INFLUENTIAL IN ADVISING THE PRESIDENT ON DOMESTIC AFFAIRS. UNFORTUNATELY, HE ALSO REMAINS ECONOMIC "CZAR", ALTHOUGH HE IS NOT PARTICULARLY KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT ECONOMIC MATTERS.

SECRET

PAGE 03 CAIRO 17706 02 OF 02 231813Z POSS DUPE

8. WHAT CONSITUENCIES DOES SADAT PERCEIVE AS REQUIRING SATISFACTION AND IN WHAT AREAS? IN ORDER OF PRIORITY, SADAT IS DOMESTICALLY CONCERNED MOST ABOUT THE MILITARY, THE WORKERS AND THE STUDENTS. THE BUREAUCRACY IS MUCH LESS OF A CONCERN AND THE FELLAC N ARE ALMOST TOTALLY DISREGARDED. ON THE FOREIGN POLICY FRONT, SADAT IS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE SAUDI - AND AS OF A FEW DAYS AGO THE SYRIAN - LEADERSHIPS' ARABIAN REACTION TO HIS POLICIES.

(A) THE MILITARY: SADAT'S ABILITY TO REMAIN IN OFFICE DEPENDS UPON CONTINUED MILITARY SUPPORT. THE MILITARY IS CLOSELY CULTIVATED BY SADAT. HE CHOSE A MILITARY OFFICER AS VP AND PERSONALLY SELECTED GAMASY, CHIEF OF STAFF FAHMAY AND OTHER SENIOR OFFICERS. HE FREQUENTLY MAKES SPEECHES TO MILITARY AUDIENCES AND IS GENUINELY INTERESTED AND KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT MILITARY STRATEGY, EQUIPMENT, AND TACTICS. ACCORDING TO SENIOR OFFICERS, MILITARY STRATEGY IS NOW (UNLIKE NASSER ERA) COORDINATED WITH THE GOE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC POLICIES WITHIN THE NSC AND SENIOR OFFICERS ARE PARTICIPATING IN THE PROCESS.

(B) STUDENTS MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT BY ALL DECISION MAKERS SINCE THEY REPRESENT THE MOST CONCENTRATED GROUPS OF POLITICIZED EGYPTIANS. THERE ARE OVER 200,000 UNIVERSITY STUDENTS IN CAIRO ALONE. SINCE 1968 THEY HAVE BECOME INCREASINGLY ACTIVE POLITICALLY AND INVOLVED IN ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATIONS. THE GOVERNMENT

TWICE DELAYED THE OPENING OF THE UNIVERSITY IN THE FALL OF 1975 BECAUSE HE FEARED STUDENT REACTION TO SINAI II. WE DO NOT BELIEVE AN ADVERSE STUDENT REACTION WOULD PREVENT SADAT FROM MAKING MAJOR FOREIGN POLICY DECISION BUT IT MIGHT WELL INHIBIT SOME OF HIS ADVISORS.

(C) WORKERS. SADAT HAS SHOWN A GROWING AWARENESS OF THE PROBLEMS FACED BY THE WORKING CLASSES, OVER TWO MILLION OF WHOM ARE IN THE CAIRO AREA BUT HIS SPEECHES AND PUBLIC UTTERANCES HAVE
SECRET

PAGE 04 CAIRO 17706 02 OF 02 231813Z POSS DUPE

NOT DEMONSTRATED A DETAILED KNOWLEDGE OF THEIR PROBLEMS. SECURITY FORCES ARE PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE TO ANY SIGN OF WORKER UNREST AND MOVE FORCEFULLY AND QUICKLY TO KEEP IT FROM SPREADING. IN FORESTALLING RISING WORKER DISCONTENT, GOE IS CLEARLY HANDICAPPED BY ITS LACK OF RESOURCES. NOT EVEN SADAT IS LIKELY TO MAKE DECISIONS THAT HE KNOWS WILL BE UNPOPULAR WITH WORKERS; E.G. LIFTING OF FOOD SUBSIDIES. THUS FAR SADAT HAS GOTTEN AWAY WITH EXPRESSIONS OF CONCERN AND VAGUE PROMISES ABOUT FUTURE PROSPERITY, BUT THE GROWING LABOR UNREST SUGGESTS THAT MORE IS GOING TO BE REQUIRED IN THE FUTURE AND HE KNOWS IT.

9. ROLE OF NATIONAL SECURITY BUREAUCRACY. THE NSC BUREAUCRACY ITSELF PLAYS A MINOR ROLE IN DECISION MAKING, EXCEPT TO THE EXTENT THAT THE INDIVIDUAL MINISTRIES PROVIDE INPUT FOR THE KEY MINISTERS. GAMSY FOR EXAMPLE, IS BELIEVED TO RELY MORE HEAVILY ON THE MINISTRY OF WAR THAN FAHMY DOES ON HIS MINISTRY. AS INSTITUTIONS, THE MINISTRIES HAVE VIRTUALLY NO POWER. DECISION MAKING IN EGYPT CONTINUES TO BE HIGHLY PERSONALIZED AFFAIR.

10. HOW MIGHT A REVITALIZED NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AFFECT FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS? THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT THE ASSEMBLY ELECTED IN NOVEMBER 1976 IS GOING TO BE CONSIDERABLY MORE RAMBUNCTIOUS AND ARTICULATE THAN ITS PREDECESSOR. THE GOVERNMENT HAS ALLOWED FORMATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND IS ENCOURAGING MEMBERS TO SPEAK OUT IN RESPONSIBLE OPPOSITION. THE ASSEMBLY MEMBERS HAVE RESPONDED BY HOLDING PUBLIC MEETINGS (NOW BEING DISCOURAGED), LIVELY DEBATES AND EXTENSIVE CRITICISM OF GOVERNMENT DOMESTIC, BUT RARELY FOREIGN, POLICY. THE ASSEMBLY, THEREFORE, HAS THE POTENTIAL FOR PLAYING A MAJOR ROLE IN POLITICAL LIFE IN EGYPT. FOR EXAMPLE, IF SADAT WERE TO DIE, THE ASSEMBLY WOULD BE THE KEY TO LEGITIMACY. IF SADAT IS UNDERMINED BY THE FAILURE OF HIS POLICIES, THE ASSEMBLY WOULD BE THE MOST LIKELY INSTITUTION TO TRY TO FILL THE VOID MUCH AS OUR CONGRESS DID IN WAKE OF WATERGATE. THIS TIME IS STILL A LONG WAY OFF. FOR TIME BEING SADAT IS STRONG ENOUGH AND POPULAR ENOUGH TO DOMINATE DECISION-MAKING, PARTICULARLY IN FOREIGN POLICY. WE
SECRET

PAGE 05 CAIRO 17706 02 OF 02 231813Z POSS DUPE

WILL BE ALERT TO ANY EROSION OF HIS AUTHORITY FOR IT WOULD INDEED

SIGNAL A MAJOR DANGER FOR US POLICY.

EILTS

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 16 SEP 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: POLITICAL STABILITY, POLICIES, INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS, POLITICAL LEADERS, CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 23 DEC 1976
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: KelleyW0
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1976CAIRO17706
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: D760471-0403
From: CAIRO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t19761293/baaaerys.tel
Line Count: 329
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION INR
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 6
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: KelleyW0
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 07 JUN 2004
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <07 JUN 2004 by CunninFX>; APPROVED <28 OCT 2004 by KelleyW0>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: ASSESSMENT OF DECISION-MAKING IN EGYPT
TAGS: PINT, PINR, EG, (SADAT, ANWAR)
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006